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1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
How clean the sun when seen in its idea,
Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven
That has expelled us and our images.
Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’2

Maksymilian Del Mar’s new book, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of
Imagination in Adjudication3 offers a finely drawn map of various ways of reasoning in
and through law. The book is about the ways that thoughts, values, commitments
and ways of seeing, move, take hold, settle, startle and – at times – release grip, reorient, and/or transmute. It is a book that is teeming with references. There are
threads to pull at everywhere.
Some legal philosophers when they write, write as if they have closed all the
books around them. One gets the opposite sense here. Del Mar seems to write from
deep in the stacks. There is an openness here, and a generous, distinctive – almost
radical – practice of naming and citing influences for Del Mar’s own thinking (a
particularly moving part of the book is Del Mar’s section on ‘The Story of the
Project’ which documents the book’s slow-build over years of reading, workshops
and teaching). The book is bric-a-brac, and knotty-pine ringed, and it would be
easy to imagine Del Mar meeting any criticism that he missed an important source or
two, or corner of literature in the fields of aesthetics, rhetoric or the philosophy of
imagination, with a good-natured pointing gesture, oh, that could go right over there.
There’s sparse reference to law in the first three chapters, and few references that
someone schooled narrowly in the field of analytical jurisprudence, as it was taught
for a good while,4 will have come across at any real frequency. Part of the book’s
contribution, as I see it, is its insistence that the study of legal reasoning raises
questions about language, and the communal use of language long and deeply
thought about in other disciplines.
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Wallace Stevens, Selected Poems (John Serio ed., 2015).
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Maksymilian Del Mar, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication (Hart 2020).
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See, eg, HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1983)
<www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253884.001.0001/acprof9780198253884> accessed 26 July 2019; Jules L Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2004).
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The book’s first three chapters, on ‘Inquiry’, ‘Artefacts’ and ‘Imagination’ (in
this order and titled as such) present as libraries of concepts and theories of models,
forms and methods for approaching artefacts, such as fictions, scenarios and
metaphors, that, as the second half of the book suggests, illuminate our
understanding of the work of artefacts, and the possibilities of artefacts, in law, and
judicial reasoning, more specifically. The references are dizzying in number, but
delicately drawn, and conscientiously offered. For example, the subject of the book’s
first chapter is inquiry, and the work of the chapter for Del Mar is to tentatively
construct his understanding of the term.5 Over the chapter, the model of inquiry that
Del Mar has in mind comes to extend beyond the traditional dichotomy of
justification and discovery (which, as Del Mar writes, has worked to separate out in
our understanding of adjudication what are thought to be analytical and normative
questions about reason-giving from empirical studies of judicial psychology and
decision-making),6 to encompass an activity shaped and embedded by interactive and
communal social dimensions,7 and diachronic dimensions,8 that is experimental and
open, and which involves normative duties.
Artefacts, as explicated through the work of Chapter 2, are forms of language
that draw us in by signalling their own artifice, asking us to make something of
them, and, as such, consciously draw in processes of imagination. Imagination, the
subject of Chapter 3, involves the construction or adoption of a new epistemic frame,
which can serve to open up different modes of affective, sensory and kinesic
participation within, or across, this freshly imagined realm, with each mode offering
the potential, at least, to move thoughts and expand ideas, to offer fluidity, vivacity,
play, insight, verve.
Near the middle of the book, at the end of Part I, Models, we get a transition
chapter entitled ‘Enabling Inquiry’ in which Del Mar sets the stage for bringing the
models previously explored (that is, models of inquiry, models of artefacts and models
of imagination) to bear on the practices of judicial reasoning in appellate cases in
common law jurisdictions. The chapter summarizes Part II of the book, Case Studies,
of which there are four, ‘Fictions’, ‘Metaphors’, ‘Figures’, ‘Scenarios’, each a chapter
that begins with what Del Mar calls an approach to the concept that describes how
each contributes to forms of interactive and collective inquiry (alongside other
5
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‘institutional infrastructure; certain other technologies, devices and strategies; an
education system, and more’9) before describing and analyzing various examples of
fictions, metaphors, figures and scenarios in common law judicial reasoning. In the
chapter on metaphors, for example, in a section on the social dimension of
metaphors, Del Mar writes
that there is a sense in which metaphor is interaction-making if not also
community making. It helps establish, or facilitates, an interaction, eg a
conversation, involving some complicity, between persons. As (Ted) Cohen
puts it, a ‘transaction is precipitated’ in which persons ‘actively engage one
another in coping with a piece of language’.10
Later the legal metaphor of the living tree constitution is introduced with Del Mar
detailing its start as an imperial metaphor, replete with paternalistic imagery and
constructed to set the frame for a broad but particular understanding of political
authority.11 It is then shown to morph into a metaphor concerned with a theory of
constitutional interpretation, which highlights for Del Mar the ways in which legal
metaphors can alter over time, and come to signify different legal terrain without, in
the view on offer, ever becoming conventionalized or uncontested.12
In each of the final four chapters in Part II, the book intends for the reader to
step, arms loaded, into the terrain of the law. This is a move that has one reaching for
a metaphor – is there before us a hurdle, a gate, or a wall? At times, this final
description feels the most apt, and in Sections 2 through 4 of this review, I explore
three sets of questions that aim to raise some of the difficulties of moving the book’s
general insights and arguments about inquiry, imagination, and artefacts into the
terrain of the law, and common-law based judicial reasoning.
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ibid 218.
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ibid 305–06.

11

ibid 319.
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2

BROAD AND LOW AND CLOSE TO THE GROUND
Language is not an abstract construction of the learned but is
something arising out of the work, needs, ties, joys, affections,
tastes, of long generations of humanity, and has its bases broad and
low, close to the ground.
Walt Whitman, ‘Slang in America’13

What twists when we think about the possibilities of language not generally
but within our existing practices of adjudication? How might the materials gatheredup and sun-dried in the early chapters meet with questions about the coercive state
apparatus,14 with police, prisons, eviction notices, border patrols, tiny corporate tax
rates etc.?15 How does the landscape shift when we think about these aspects at work
in the practice of judicial reasoning, where questions about legal institutions, political
economy and history arise to foreground laws, at times, perniciously false claims to
legitimacy, and, at times, utterly hollow rhetorical associations with justice? How to
think about creativity and word and image play (even as audience, researcher or
witness) in the face of the brute power imbalance between the judge and, as
Dworkin used to put it, the person in the well of the court? How does someone with
a great deal of power over others know if they’ve ever written a line capable of
stirring insight or delivered a joke that elicited real laughter. I take these to be serious
epistemic and political questions.
Del Mar is a remarkably subtle and attentive legal philosopher but here the
questions still loom large over whether and how it is possible to examine legal
reasoning as an abstract form given the history and place of law in the operation of
the various state and transnational legal systems.16 In the book’s concluding chapter,
in a section entitled, ‘The Politics of Artefacts and Imagination’, Del Mar addresses

13

Walt Whitman, ‘Slang in America’ (1885) 141 The North American Review 431.
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Alan Hunt, ‘Law, State and Class Struggle’ (1976) 20 Marxism Today
<https://legalform.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/hunt-law-state-and-class-struggle-19761.pdf>.
Accessed March 7, 2022.
15

Rocio Lorca, ‘The Presumption of Punishment: A Critical Review of Its Early Modern Origins’
(2016) 29 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 385; Rocio Lorca, ‘Punishing the Poor and the
Limits of Legality’ [2018] Law, Culture and the Humanities 1-20; Rocío Lorca, ‘Sick and Blamed:
Criminal Law in the Chilean Response to COVID-19’ (2021) 50 Netherlands Journal of Legal
Philosophy 142.
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his decision not to foreground questions concerning the history and politics of the
use of artefacts in judicial reasoning. Del Mar writes:
I wanted to focus in this book on inquiry, ie the process of generating insight
into what values, vulnerabilities and interests might be at stake in a case and in
others potentially like it in the future. The difficulty with placing the politics
of legal form and cognition in the foreground is that it can all too easily slide
into a cynical exercise in which we see all such forms and processes via a filter
of suspicion, of masked domination, violence, and exclusion. However, I
struggled with paying equal attention to this dimension and to the ways that
the forms and processes of legal practice can enable inquiry. Given the lack of
defences of artefactual language and imagination in adjudication, I erred on
the side of being upbeat and positive about the capacity of these forms and
processes to contribute to the making of normative insight and thus to doing
justice.17
We see this differently. I do not yet see how it might be possible to map out the
formal attributes and artefactual aspects of common law judicial reasoning without
being open to the charge that the work is ahistorical and acontextual, and, thus, at
root, missing something deep and significant at the level of politics.18 It seems
necessary to ask the question of whether and how artefacts of judicial reasoning that
have been rooted in particular institutional forms and historical contexts have been
prone to serving certain political ends over others. The methods of ideal theory
abstract away concerns about the politics of distribution, about compliance, about
the coercive apparatus of the state,19 including the coercive ideological apparatus of
the state, and so too – as the recently passed political philosopher Charles Mills put it
so powerfully in his book, The Racial Contract – the injustices of the past perpetrated
through law.20 In the field of international law, there is a rich literature detailing how
the self-stylized technical and professionalized form of legal writing is not just
removed from questions of impact, that is - staid, dry, and grip-less in the day-to-

17

Del Mar (n 2) 442.
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See, eg, Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions (Harvard University Press
2016).
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See, eg, Robert Cover’s often-cited criticism of JB White in Robert M Cover, ‘Violence and the
Word’ (1986) 95 The Yale Law Journal 1601.

20

Charles W Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press 2011).

6

day,21 but acts as cover for a pernicious and at times brutal and totalizing - politics of
extraction, exclusion, dispossession and structured inequality.22 The book argues that
artefactual reasoning is part of legal reasoning, and here it is largely successful, but it
can’t leave behind the question of whether these forms are prone to serving the same
ends. Capacious artefacts of legal reasoning like the standard of civilization,23 sovereign
debt24 and the doctrine of terra nullius25 have been used to serve highly specific
interests, giving legal warrant to acts of dispossession and violence. On the page,
maybe even in the brief, we might see possibilities threaded through the images of
some artefacts of legal inquiry, but it will be important to seek out the specific ways
that these possibilities are altered, if not altogether foreclosed,26 when brought into
the formal, institutionalized practices of common law adjudication.27
Del Mar understands language as social, as something that we respond to as
‘affective, sensory, and embodied beings’28 and as ‘something that is connected, in
complex ways, to the exercise of power, ie it is both capable of creating power
imbalances and enabling the powerful to exploit the vulnerable, as well as being a
21

Or, as Gerry Simpson recently, and splendidly, put it, ‘this disembodied, disarticulated discipline’.
Gerry Simpson, The Sentimental Life of International Law: Literature, Language, and Longing in World
Politics (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2021).
22

See, eg, Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the
Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press 2011)
<http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139048200> accessed 27 June 2020; Ntina Tzouvala,
Capitalism As Civilisation: A History of International Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2020)
<www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108684415/type/book> accessed 20 January 2022;
James Crawford, Martti Koskenniemi and Surabi Ranganathan, The Cambridge Companion to
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).
23
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Robert Knox, ‘Haiti at the League of Nations: Racialisation, Accumulation and Representation’
(2020) 21 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1.
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John Borrows, ‘The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia’ (2015) 48
University of British Columbia law review 701; Jeffery G Hewitt, ‘Land Acknowledgment, Scripting
and Julius Caesar’ (2019) 88 Supreme Court Law Review 27.
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One example here comes from an excellent supervised research project written by a JD student that
illustrated how several legal arguments that would advance justice for trans individuals seeking lifesaving health care could not find footing within current judicial constructions of the s 7 right to Life,
Liberty and Security of the Person under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part 1 of
the Constitution Act, 1982. Francis Nasca, ‘Access to Gender-Affirming Surgery in Ontario: A Section
7 Analysis of the Ontario Health Insurance Plan Funding Regime’ (Osgoode Hall Law School).
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Emily Kidd White, ‘Till Human Voices Wake Us: The Role of Emotions in the Adjudication of
Dignity Claims’ (2014) 3 Journal of Law, Religion and State 201.
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resource of the vulnerable against the powerful’.29 For Del Mar legal language is, at
least to an extent, indeterminant and open, with artefacts like metaphors, scenarios
and fictions playing a role in establishing these elements. Del Mar is aligned with
James Boyd White who he says ‘did not see legal language as closing down
possibilities for meaning-making, but rather precisely as offering resources for its
continual transformation’.30 Citing White’s book, The Legal Imagination, Del Mar
finds that because law is a social, interactive and communal activity, that it is open to
‘multiple stories, multiple languages’.31
Under a section entitled ‘Rhetoric, Power, Violence’ there is a reference to
Peter Goodrich whose writing on the politics of legal language
foreground(s) the following questions: ‘Who is speaking? Who has the right
to speak? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it their own special
quality, their prestige, and from whom, in return, do they receive if not the
assurance, at least the presumption that what they say is true?’32
Del Mar makes space for this argument but counters that this is not the only way
legal language works, to which we might wish to respond, is this not the way in
which legal language has overwhelmingly worked? To release this concern, might
we have to hold some sort of empirical view about the law – in some places, all
places – gradually moving towards justice?33 Or the more subtle view that artefacts of
legal reasoning themselves can alter the practices, institutions and material
foundations of adjudication. If the latter, then how? The book emphasizes the
possibilities of legal language to further conditions of justice, but part of its enduring
impact might be the way it sets up the crucial question of constraint, pushing readers
to seek out the ways in which existing legal systems foreclose, deradicalize, placate,
harness and/or co-opt these possibilities through adjudicatory processes.

29

ibid.
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Maksymilian Del Mar, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication (Hart
2020) 83.
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ibid 83.
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ibid 85. (Citing Peter Goodrich, ‘Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction’
(1984), 11 Journal of Law and Society (2) 173 at 176).
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But ‘time is neutral’, as Dr Reverend Martin Luther King memorably wrote. Martin Luther King,
Letter from Birmingham City Jail (American Friends Service Committee 1963).
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3

ON THE NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF INQUIRY IN LAW

For Del Mar, the normative duty to engage in inquiry arises because
adjudication involves stakes pertaining to particular ‘values, vulnerabilities and
interests’34 and it is important to try to ascertain these clearly. The elements that
comprise Del Mar’s conception of inquiry in legal reasoning - the openness, the
embeddedness, the duty to inquire into the values, vulnerabilities and interests
existing in a case (or like cases in future), illuminate the challenging task of doing
justice for Del Mar, and encourage us ‘to think of the process (of seeking justice) as
an on-going activity, one which we engage in together, ie interactively and
collectively, and over time, and one which we never be wholly satisfied with, nor
ever complete or finish’.35 The book sets out its argument on the normative
dimensions of inquiry, explicitly from pages 66–77, though it deepens in various
ways across the chapters. Del Mar summarizes the argument as such:
Specific artefacts, like fictions, metaphors, figures, and scenarios, and their
related processes of imagination are valuable when they assist interactive and
collective practices of inquiry, in the instant case and over time, providing
modes of experimentation that allow for the making of insights as to what
values, vulnerabilities and interests might be at stake in the case and in cases
potentially like it in the future.36
It is useful for Del Mar to set out this explicit functional, normative argument so
clearly. It opens space for the reader to productively apply pressure to the account. As
the argument is situated within common-law appellate reasoning, there is a real
question about how we are to consider and weigh this future gaze that is alluded to
in the argument. The book is not altogether clear on the utopian aspects of this
account. Is the future envisioned one in which all existing legal principles are
fulfilled? Is it a just future (however this might be substantively constructed)? These
don’t necessarily lead to the same picture of things. The account also leaves open the
question of how traditional Rule of Law principles,37 the ones offered by Lon Fuller

34

Del Mar (n 2) 66.

35

ibid 69.

36

ibid 30.
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Catherine Z Elgin, ‘Impartiality and Legal Reasoning’ in Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar
(eds), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning (Hart Publishing 2020)
<www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/virtue-emotion-and-imagination-in-law-and-legalreasoning> accessed 2 July 2020.
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for example,38 interact with its model for normative inquiry in common law legal
reasoning. Questions about the weight and authority of precedent loom,39 and, so
too, questions about the considerations of fairness at play between past and future
persons.40
An important piece of the work that remains underspecified is the
interrelationship or priority accorded to the values, interests and vulnerabilities that a
judge is meant to seek out (and not only amongst themselves, but across categories,
and as against existing legal precedents and principles). Is the goal that everything is
illuminated? If so, are these values, interests and vulnerabilities simply meant to be
brought to light, or are they meant to have some sort of special impact on the
reasoning, and eventual judgement and/or legal remedy provided? What are the
decision rules for the invariable conflicts arising among and between them? Or is
there a presumed unity of value at play, or a quiet pitch for the utilitarianism of
Bentham or Mill?
Del Mar is interested not just in the presence of artefacts in judicial reasoning
but in the ways in which those artefacts might facilitate the pursuit of justice through
adjudication. Here the work of John Gardner is especially illuminating.41 In
Gardner’s view, it is because law involves adjudication that it necessarily implicates
the virtue of justice, which is the virtue that accords to questions of proportionality –
that is, who gets what and why (and we could add GEM Anscombe here for the
question, and via whom).42 For Gardner, a court cannot avoid questions of
proportionality, of allocation, of distribution.43 Justice is an all-things-considered
judgement, and legal precedent, practice, and the interpretation of principles over
time factor but, so too, can come into tension with what justice requires. As Gardner
writes,
Perhaps the underlying mistake of some legal formalists is to think that the
only goods and ills that have to be allocated between litigating parties are the
38

Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev ed, Yale University Press 1969).

39

Nina Varsava, ‘The Gravitational Force of Future Decisions’, Philosophical Foundations of Precedent
(Oxford University Press Forthcoming)
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3956848>. Accessed March 8, 2022.
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ibid.
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John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (1st ed, Oxford University Press
2012).
42

GEM Anscombe, ‘On the Source of the Authority of the State’ (1978) 20 Ratio (Oxford) 1.

43

Gardner (n 39).
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goods and ills of fulfilled and frustrated expectations, so that so long as the law
does not frustrate any of the expectations it creates, but fulfils them all by
sticking to the rules, it cannot but be just. There are three mistakes here. The
first is the neglect of the other things that must still be allocated apart from the
frustrated and fulfilled expectations (such as the losses and the penalties). The
second is the mistake of thinking that justice would always be in favour of
minimizing frustrated expectations on both sides when in fact, were the
expectations morally abhorrent ones, justice might be in favour of
maximizing frustrated expectations on both sides. The third is to think that
whatever expectations the law itself creates cannot but be legitimate ones,
even when they are morally abhorrent.44
Following this, it seems imperative to work out the precise pull of the inherent
conservativism that exists within the past-looking, common-law practices of judicial
reasoning. Should past decisions that have supported injustice supply constraint even
where they have not been recognized as violations of positive law? What of the
quiet, path-setting, frame-setting decisions that have furthered injustice? The book
gestures at something potentially revolutionary about the role of inquiry and
imagination in legal reasoning, something radical in the identification of certain notyet-legally recognized interests, values and vulnerabilities but the structures, forces
and habits that might work to resist these movements are, in the book, out of frame.
This section on normative inquiry brought to mind a response to HLA Hart’s
understanding of legal obligation45 – as being something we feel the pull of – that
doesn’t in Hart’s use of the term amount to a fully blown moral obligation, with the
response that if you are interested in obligation, you need to be interested in morally
real obligation.46 Cast in the terms of the book, if we are interested in the normative
dimensions of legal inquiry, aren’t we interested in the shape of the normative
commitments that further justice full stop? If so, we might need to be open to the
charge that the confines of the judicial role, and common-law reasoning, are a less
than ideal place to work out these questions.
44

ibid.

45

HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press 1972).

46

See, eg, RM Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press 1986); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays
on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press 1979)
<www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.001.0001/acprof9780198253457> accessed 26 July 2019; Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value (Oxford University Press
2005) <www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278466.001.0001/acprof9780199278466> accessed 26 July 2019.
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4

ON AFFECTIVE IMAGINATION

Imagination for Del Mar ‘is a combination, and indeed a balancing act, of two
simultaneously exercised and active processes: first, the entrance into a distinct
epistemic frame, in which we selectively suspend certain epistemic norms and
commitments; and second, participation along a spectrum of affective, sensory and
kinesic involvement’.47 It involves movement across the inside and the outside of a
frame, and ‘a mixture of passivity and activity, of distance and immersion, of being
offline and online, of withdrawal and participation’.48 Strikingly, Del Mar’s model
does not treat imagination ‘as a rare exercise of genius, and it does not seek to burden
imagination with the demands of creativity’.49 One response to this might be to
worry once more, as I have above, about how the training and social power of the
judge might constrain these processes of imagination. On this I say more below.
Another might be to say, in the interest of justice, that we do need to aim for
something akin to genuine creativity here. That is, something capable of radically
reorienting our thinking about what justice in adjudication demands. Something
that is not apt to settle for a politics of appeasement. For the poet Wallace Stevens,
genuine creativity is so rare that the poet seems to sit as God in the moment of
creation.50 It is a high bar but a useful thought because it highlights the propensity to
claim insight when we are just repeating lines and phrases, and playing old chords,
while left open to the charge that even our best images and metaphors derive mainly
from habits and well-trodden pathways of thought.51 The blunt concern here is the
idea of a judge aiming at cleverness, or profundity, while managing to deliver only a
dressed-up version of the same old hand, the same pernicious errors supported with
the full power of the court; the vice of preciousness disguising a politics, yet again.

47

Del Mar (n 2) 26.

48

ibid.

49

ibid 126.

50

Stevens (n 1). See, eg, ‘The Man on the Dump’ at 117. As explained by Murdoch, ‘Poetry is the
creation of linguistic quasi-things; prose is for explanation’: Iris Murdoch, ‘Against Dryness: A
Polemical Sketch’ (1961) 16 Encounter. Cited also in Gerry Simpson, ‘The Sentimental Life of
International Law’ (2015) 3 London Review of International Law 3.
51

Virginia Woolf cast the idea as follows: ‘Words, English words, are full of echoes, of memories, of
associations – naturally. They have been out and about, on people’s lips, in their houses, in the streets,
in the fields, for so many centuries. And that is one of the chief difficulties in writing them today –
that they are so stored with meanings, with memories’. BBC, ‘Virginia Woolf “On Craftsmanship”’
(29 April 1937) <www.literaturecambridge.co.uk/news/craftsmanship>. Accessed March 8, 2022.
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I gather the underlying claim is that methods of inquiry, that is, these artefacts
and fictions, can be used in accordance with political virtue, or political vice. This is
surely correct, though I think I part ways with Del Mar when he says that ‘because of
the difficulties of judging, judges often employ a more experimental attitude and
more experimental epistemic practices, eg being less assertive, and embracing
uncertainty rather than pretending it is not here’.52 We are trading intuitions here
but it seems we more regularly see the opposite, that is, shows of assurance and
conviction, and full-throated reasons detailing the necessity, or rightness even, of a
ruling.
Both Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil wrote on the difficulty of grasping the
lived experiences of others,53 and the difficulty of working beyond the ego in
processes of inquiry. 54 In the terms of the book, this translates into a concern about
the ways in which artefacts of legal reasoning can be fashioned, consciously or not,
to re-confirm one’s own prior commitments.55 The role of intuitions is not discussed
at length in the book, and the conditions under which we might know when they
have been revised, or revised in accordance with justice, remain unclear.56 It seems
imperative to ask, however, about when, and how we might know when, inquiry is
real, as opposed to a gesture, a dalliance, or a self-pleasing fantasy. And, so too, the
more fundamental question about what it means to ask whether an inquiry might be
real. How might inquiry move the structure of our thoughts, and normative
commitments? Inquiry clearly pushes us beyond our prior commitments at times, but
we also are heavily rationalizing, self-deceiving creatures.57 As seats of power seem
well able to exacerbate this tendency, it would be useful to probe the ways the

52

Del Mar (n 2) 203.

53

Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1st American ed, Allan Lane, The Penguin Press
1993); Murdoch (n 48); Simone Weil, The Iliad: Or, The Poem of Force (Mary McCarthy ed, Pendle
Hill 1956).
54

Weil (n 51). Simone Weil wrote of the difficulty of witnessing the suffering of another without
either moving to obscure the other’s pain (often by way of erasing their subjectivity, and/or lowering
their status), or by entertaining some measure of self-satisfaction or voyeuristic pleasure. For Weil, the
efforts of holding one’s attention on a subject, while actively and conscientiously resisting the slide
into more pleasurable (or simply less agitating) emotional states, constituted an ethic.
55

Emily Kidd White, ‘On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning’ in Amalia
Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (eds), Virtue, Emotion, and Imagination in Legal Reasoning (Hart
Publishing 2020).
56

See, eg, Thomas Nagel, ‘Types of Intuition’ (2021) 43 London Review of Books.

57

Murdoch (n 48); Maria Aristodemou, ‘A Constant Craving for Fresh Brains and a Taste for
Decaffeinated Neighbours’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 35.
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judicial role might constrain Del Mar’s model of inquiry along these lines?58 As Iris
Murdoch wrote, much of what we think of as inquiry is fantasy.59 For Murdoch, ‘we
are not isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but benighted creatures
sunk in a reality whose nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to
deform by fantasy’.60 She continues, ‘what we require is a renewed sense of the
difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons’.61 I have
written in the past of the concern that judges use ill or false versions of empathy in
their legal reasoning practices, drawing on the language of the claimant, without real
efforts to understand their station or point of view.62 The concern here is how judges
might employ artefacts to entrench their own intuitions (or more perniciously, their
own stereotypes, and prejudices) about the claimant and the case, whilst committing
the specific wrong of using others as argumentative props after a costless exploration
into their lives.63
Del Mar might respond that there is no place outside of language to work out
these questions of justice. I am interested in further explication of this view, and the
idea that the work is to develop the sensibilities required to ascertain real values,
vulnerabilities and interests and to weigh them clearly. If you are doing this in an
ego-centric way – the response could go – then you are doing this badly, and in a
manner that furthers injustice over justice. That might be right, but there is still a
question whether the normative framework outlined above gives us a sufficiently
structured politics to understand when and how this might go awry in our reasoning
efforts.
Two of my favourite stories to teach with in legal theory involve the writings
of John Borrows on his Grandpa Josh in ‘Indian Agency: Forming First Nations Law

58

See, eg, Susan Bandes’ writings on the deeply problematic ways that judges think they are
evaluating the emotion of remorse in sentencing. Susan A Bandes, ‘Remorse and Demeanor in the
Courtroom: Cognitive Science and the Evaluation of Contrition’, in About the Integrity of Criminal
Process: From Theory into Practice (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2016).
59

For Del Mar on Murdoch’s understanding of fantasy, see Del Mar (n 2) 127.

60

Murdoch (n 48).

61

ibid.

62

White (n 53).

63

White (n 51).

14

in Canada’,64 and Patricia Williams in ‘The Raw and Half-Cooked’.65 Both pieces
include stories that offer highly generative, sideways-entry critiques of dominant
legal positions on the relationship of law to land, or the relationship of law to rights.
The latter piece recounts the story of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti through the
perspective of a commodity, that is, a bag of rice, and then later through a
fantastical-seeming story about a child awoken from the dead. As I take it, the power
of these stories, along with their images, their fictionality (and suspensions), their
vivacity and pull, and their implicit invitations to break boundaries – draw from
them being stories about law that are markedly outside the bounds of the usual
practices of common law appellate legal reasoning. Therein lies their critical
purchase and power. The crux might be that the existing institution-bound practices
of judicial reasoning just can’t be our locus of interest if we want to think about the
ways in which artefacts in our language about law contribute to justice.

5
CONCLUSION: METAPHORS, FICTIONS AND OPEN-ROAD
FUTURES
All of the formal properties have to be cracked and the simplicities released.
Saul Bellow in a letter to John Berryman66

Del Mar’s philosophical method is one that mimics the building of a stone
wall, and where something feels sturdy it is because you’ve seen the pieces set into
the places that make it so. The book is rich-textured, and deeply generous, offering
insights, references, lines of inquiry and highly detailed, fruitful models that readers
interested in legal theory will be apt to hold onto.
If, alongside Del Mar, we are looking for justice, it seems incumbent upon us
to consider how the strictures of judicial reasoning – even after recognizing the
varieties of artefactual language present within it – may remain even still too narrow.
What are the institutional, economic and political pre-conditions for the possibilities
associated with language so beautifully established in the book to settle or thrive vis64
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à-vis the existing infrastructures and practices of common law adjudication? The
book doesn’t spell out this conclusion as it might have done, but part of its enduring
impact might be that we come to feel the pressure of the question and ask what sort
of political life could open up the generative capacities of language to begin to serve
justice in public processes of adjudication, for the language of law to be open,
communal, curious, sensitive to past and alive to place, and somehow future-gazing?
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